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unduly prejudicial to them and unduly preferential to their competitors,
and entered an order requiring that their rates not exceed the rates
charged other competitors in the same general origin territory.
Decisions of the ICC are not necessarily final and may be taken
before the federal courts. But once it is determined that the Commis-
sion is acting within its statutory authority, the court's power to review
its findings of fact and rulings is extremely limited. 14 Congress in-
tended to commit these problems to a permanent expert body and the
courts recognize that they have neither the "technical competence nor
the legal authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken
by the Commission."'15 Numerous examples of court deference to the
administrative expertise of the Interstate Commerce Commission reveal
a marked indisposition even to consider the amount of weight given to
each of the factors used in determining the justifiableness of a rate, and
this proposition seems particularly applicable where the problem in-
volved concerns fixing of rates for competing areas.'0
By reaffirming in the instant case its policy of rare interference with
the Commission's rulings, the court facilitates the reaching of the sound-
est possible solution to a problem for which it can hardly be hoped to
find a perfect one.
CHARLEs L. FuLTON.
Anti-trust Laws-Requirements Contracts-Tests of Illegality
Section 3 of the Clayton Act' declares, inter alia, that "It shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . ..
whether patented or unpatented . . . on the condition, agreement or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods . . . of a competitor ... of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale... may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce."
Since its passage in 1914, the United States Supreme Court, while
not always denominating them, has had occasion to deal with two sepa-
1 I. C. C. v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 (1947) ; United States v. Chicago Heights
Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344 (1939).
"Board of Trade of Kansas City v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942).1 United States v. Ill. Central R. R., 263 U.S. 515 (1924). Also see the state-
ment of Mr. Justice Douglas in the instant case: "We would depart from our
competence and our limited function in this field if we undertook to accommodate
the factors of transportation conditions, distance and competition differently than
the Commission has done in this case. That is a task peculiarly for it." 69 S. Ct.
278, 289.
'38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §14 (1946).
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rate and distinct types of contracts2 which have been attacked as viola-
tive of that statute.
The first case to reach the court, Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co.,3 involved the so-called exclusive dealing arrangement 4
whereby the purchaser agrees to buy all his requirements of a certain
product or products from the seller and the seller agrees to fully supply
the purchaser. The Fashion company, through such contracts, con-
trolled 40% of the pattern agencies in the country.
The court pointed out that the statute did not prohibit all contracts
that created a mere possibility that competition would be lessened, but
that a probable, substantial lessening had to be shown. However, be-
cause the defendant occupied such a dominant position in the industry,
it felt that the lower courts were justified in finding that the challenged
contracts substantially lessened competition in that they foreclosed com-
petitors of the seller from a large portion of a total market and were,
therefore, illegal.
Shortly thereafter the validity of the other type of contract, the
tying agreement, was brought into question in the case of United Shoe
Machinery Co. v. United States.5 Defendant-patentee leased its patented
shoe machinery subject to the requirement that it be used only with
other machinery also leased by defendant and that the lessee buy all its
supplies from the lessor. Defendant controlled 95% of the business in
the industry. Held: "Such restrictive and tying agreements must nec-
essarily lessen competition and tend to monopoly .... When it is con-
sidered that the United Company occupies a dominating position in
supplying shoe machinery of the classes involved, these covenants,
signed by the lessee and binding upon him, effectually prevent him from
acquiring the machinery of a competitor of the lessor.. .. -6
In both cases, then, the Supreme Court placed emphasis on evidence
that defendant occupied a dominant position in the industry. Until the
decision in International Salt Co. v. United States7 this continued to
be so. Domination of the market was regarded "as sufficient in itself to
support the inference that competition had been or probably would be
lessened" s by use of the restrictive contract, whether a requirements
- Technically, a third type of contract has been attacked in one case. Federal
Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923), in which an
agency contract was challenged as being an exclusive dealing arrangement.
a258 U.S. 346 (1922).
'Variously called the "requirements contract," Standard Oil Co. of California
v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949); and the "exclusive supply contract,"
Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements
Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rnv. 412, 416 (1948).
6258 U.S. 451 (1922). 8Id. at 457, 458.
7332 U.S. 392 (1947).
" See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, - U.S. - , 69 S. Ct.
1051, 1056 (1949).
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or tying agreement. Thus, requirements contracts were held violative
of section 3 where defendants employing them did 90%,D 60%,o 50%11
and 40%12 of the business, as were tying clause arrangements where de-
fendants controlled 95%13 and 81%. 14
On the other hand, where defendant did but one per cent of the
business in the industry, it was held that its requirements contracts were
not illegal and the court was significantly careful to point out that in
other respects the case fell "fairly within the recent decision of . ..
Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co."'15
Later, however, the circuit courts discarded the requirement of a
showing of dominance in the tying clause cases. Although their users
protested that they were either required for the protection of good will10
or commercially necessary because of contract commitments of repair,' 7
the tying agreements were made very vulnerable by the substitution of
the more easily satisfied "quantitative" test.'8 Under this standard, a
defendant's comparative position in the industry became unimportant
if it could be shown that the volume of business done by him was quan-
titatively large. In the International Salt case the Supreme Court un-
qualifiedly endorsed this view, declaring the tying devices "unreasonable,
per se" where "any substantial market" is involved.' 0
After the International Salt decision, then, the state of the law could
be summarized as follows: In both requirements and tying clause agree-
ments a probable substantial lessening of competition had to be shown
9 Fleischmann Co., 1 F. T. C. 119 (1918).
10 Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312
U.S. 457 (1940).1 Q. R. S. Music Co. v. F. T. C., 12 F. 2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926).1 0Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922); But-
terick Co. v. F. T. C., 4 F. 2d 910 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 602 (1925).
Unte Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
"B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. F. T. C., 292 Fed. 720, 721 (7th Cir. 1923).
1International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936);
Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F. 2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aft'd per
curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936). The contention that the tying clause was necessary to
protect good will was upheld in Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., supra;
cf. F. T. C. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
" International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Judson L.
Thomson Mfg. Co. v. F. T. C., 150 F. 2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945).
's This test required only a showing that the tying clauses covered a substantial
market, measured quantitatively. Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. F. T. C., 132 F. 2d
48, 54 (4th Qr. 1942) : "If a dealer by such unfair trade practice as is here in-
volved restrains competition with respect to his customers, he ought not be per-
mitted to continue it because his portion of the national business is small . . .
(Where defendant did but from 5% to 7% of the business in the trade.) ; Oxford
Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F. 2d 764, 766 (6th Cir. 1936) : "The
ratio borne by the defendant's volume of business to the paint and varnish industry
is not, we think, the measure by which monopolistic tendency of its contracts is to
be determined." (Where defendant did but one-half of one per cent of the business
in the trade.) ; accord, Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. F. T. C., 150 F. 2d 952
(1st Cir. 1945).
1 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
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to satisfy section 3 of the Clayton Act.20  Where the former type was
concerned nothing less than the inference of a substantial lessening, aris-
ing out of the employment of such contracts by companies dominant in
their industry would satisfy the requirement, whereas in the latter, a
showing that defendant 'did a quantitatively substantial business would
give rise to the same inference and render the contracts illegal.
The justification for dealing less harshly with requirements contracts
than with tying clause arrangements has been discussed by many
writers.21
Whereas both types of agreements lessen competition in the sense
that they deprive the seller or lessor's competitors of access to the mar-
ket provided by the purchaser or lessee for the duration of the agree-
ment, the requirement contracts, as contrasted with the tying agree-
ments, do have legitimate business purposes. They benefit the buyer in
that they assure him of a constant and adequate supply and thereby
relieve him of the necessity of storing commodities for which his demand
varies. Furthermore, by protecting him against rises in prices, they
enable him to engage in long-term planning on the basis of known costs.
The seller is also benefited in that he is assured of his demand and con-
sequently may cut down on his selling expenses. If he is a newcomer
to the field, he may estimate what capital expenses are justified by esti-
mating, on the basis of such contracts, what the demand for his product
will be. Still more important is the fact that if competition for the pa-
tronage of the ultimate consumer is present, the benefits accruing to
the contracting parties must necessarily be passed on to the general
public in the form of lower costs and better service.
On the other hand, tying agreements have been used only for the
suppression of competition. They are the means of coercing the lessee
who needs the patented article into buying all his supplies from the
patentee, and thereby,.in effect, extending the patent-sanctioned monop-
oly to unpatented goods which are tied to it. Benefits from the ar-
rangement will rarely accrue either to the lessee or the public, and in
the usual case both will suffer since the monopolist has the power to
charge what the traffic will bear.
Whether or not this preferential treatment of requirements contracts
was justified, the late case of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States22 has made it clear that they will no longer be accorded it. In
that case, defendant, doing business in seven western states, sold 23%
of the gasoline purchased in that area during the year 1946. The-
majority of these sales were made through company-owned service sta-
o Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922).
21 E.g., Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Re-
quirements Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 412 (1948).2269 S. Ct. 1051 (1949).
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tions or to industrial users, and the percentage of the total purchases
from all suppliers which were made pursuant to defendant's exclusive
supply contracts was but 6.7%. However, the dollar volume of Stand-
ard's business in the same year was large, amounting to over $58 million.
The District Court,2 3 when presented with these figures, could dis-
cover scant authority among the requirements contract cases for a find-
ing that they showed any substantial lessening of competition. Per-
centages had always controlled, and, as noted above, there was no re-
quirements case where a defendant had been found to occupy a market
position sufficiently dominant to make its interference substantial in the
absence of a showing that it had done at least 40%5 of the business in
the industry.24 However, the court was of the opinion that the tying
clause case of International Salt Co. v. United States controlled,2 and,
finding sales under the exclusive supply contracts quantitatively large,
determined that they were illegal. In so doing, it refused to hear testi-
mony as to the commercial merits of the exclusive dealing arrangements
or to make findings as to whether Standard's competitive position had
improved or deteriorated under the system.20
The Supreme Court, after reviewing all section 3 cases with which
it had dealt prior to the International Salt case, concluded that none con-
trolled since they had stressed the dominant position of defendant in the
market and Standard did not occupy such a position. Moreover, the
court conceded the economic advantages of the requirements contract
and admitted that "since these advantages . . . may often be sufficient
to account for their use, the coverage by such contracts of a substantial
amount of business affords a weaker basis for the inference that compe-
tition may be lessened than would similar coverage by tying clauses.
. . .," It therefore felt that it "could not dispose of this case merely
by citing International Salt Co. v. United States"28 which involved the
tying agreement.
So, instead of relying on that case, it turned to the statute itself and
observed that since the requirements contract is one for the "sale of
goods ... on the condition ... that the ... purchaser thereof shall not
2 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 78 F. Supp. 850 (S. D. Cal.
1948), aff'd, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949).
-" See notes 9-15 supra.
5 While perhaps the court felt that the "dominance" test could be met in this
case by virtue of the fact that other major suppliers in the area also employed the
exclusive supply device and, considered collectively, dominated the market, it rested
its decision on the quantitative test, saying ". . . as I read the latest cases of
the Supreme Court, I am compelled to find the practices here involved to be viola-
tive [of section three]. For they affect injuriously a sizeable part of interstate
commerce . . ." United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 78 F. Supp. 850,
875 (S. D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 69 S. Ct. 1051 (1949).
2' Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 1051, 1054 (1949).
1051, 1054 (1949).
"'Id. at 1059. 28Ibid.
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use or deal in the goods . . .of a competitor or competitors of the ...
seller,"29 it must fall within the prohibitions of section 3 if "the effect
of such . . .contract . . .may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."8 0
The court was of the opinion that in determining this "effect" it
could give no consideration to the commercial merits and demerits of
the contract involved, because it was not faced "with a broadly phrased
expression of general policy [leaving it free to apply a more lenient test
of illegality to requirements contracts], but merely a broadly phrased
qualification of an otherwise narrowly directed statutory provision,"31
and that the congressional intent behind the legislation had been to out-
law all exclusive dealing contracts which foreclose competion in a quan-
titatively substantial share of the line of commerce affected.
So interpreted, the statute did not leave room for evidence as to
defendant's competitive position in the industry nor for testimony as to
the commercial justification of the contract in the particular case. Con-
sequently, the judgment below was affirmed.
Whatever arguments may be advanced against it, the decision in the
Standard Oil case makes it clear that all restrictive contracts, whether
of the tying or requirements variety, are illegal, without regard to sur-
rounding circumstances and without resort to inference, if used by a
defendant doing a quantitatively substantial volume of business.8 2
Section 3 does not, of course, deal with the ordinary long-term con-
tract in which the purchaser agrees to buy a denominated amount of
goods from the seller rather than all his requirements. Neither does it
affect contracts of agency wherein the agent gets all his requirements
from the principal. Moreover, the tying clause and requirements con-
tract would likewise seem to be legal if its employer does not do a sub-
stantial volume of business in dollars and cents. Thus the small busi-
nessman can continue to use them in safety, if he can be sure that he
is small enough. The difficulty is in the determination of where the
line will be drawn between substantiality and insubstantiality.
ROBERT PERRY, JR.
3O38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §14 (1946).
80 Ibid.
3 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 1051, 1061 (1949).
'- "We conclude, therefore, that the qualifying clause of section 3 is satisfied by
proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of
commerce affected:' Id. at 1062.
19.501
